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Dani Rodrik (2008) offers a provocative argument for policies that seek to maintain
an “undervalued” exchange rate in order to promote economic growth. The key to
his argument is the empirical evidence that he presents, indicating correlation of his
measure of undervaluation with economic growth in cross-country panel regressions.
Rodrik does not really discuss the measures that should be undertaken to maintain
an undervalued exchange rate, and whether it is likely that a country that pursues
undervaluation as a growth strategy should be able to maintain persistent undervalu-
ation. For example, he remarks (as justification for interest in the question of a causal
effect of undervaluation on growth) that “one of the key findings of the open-economy
macro literature is that nominal exchange rates and real exchange rates move quite
closely together.” But while this is true, and while it is widely interpreted as indicat-
ing that monetary policy can affect real exchange rates (since it can obviously move
nominal rates), it hardly follows that monetary policy alone can maintain a weak real
exchange rate for long enough to serve as part of a long-run growth strategy.
Indeed, conventional theoretical models with short-run price stickiness, that are
perfectly consistent with the observed short-run effects of monetary policy on real
exchange rates, imply that monetary policy should not have long-run effects on real
exchange rates. Rodrik also cites evidence showing that sterilized interventions in
the foreign-exchange market can affect real exchange rates. But economic theory
suggests that interventions not associated with any change in current or subsequent
monetary policy should have even more transitory effects. And the experiences of
countries that have sought to use devaluation to boost economic growth have often
found that the real exchange rate effect of a nominal devaluation is not long-lasting.1
Nonetheless, the point of the paper is to provide evidence that undervaluation
favors growth, on the assumption that policies to maintain undervaluation are avail-
able, and it is that central contention that I shall examine here. I find the evidence
less persuasive than the paper suggests, for two reasons. First, I believe that the
paper exaggerates the strength and robustness of the association between the real
exchange rate and growth in the cross-country evidence. And second, even granting
the existence of such a correlation, a causal effect of real exchange rates on growth is
hardly the only possible interpretation.
1The case of South Korea, discussed further in section 3, is an example.
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1 How Strong Is the Association of
Undervaluation with Economic Growth?
Rodrik’s central findings derive from variations on a panel regression of the form
growthit = α + β lnRGDPCHit−1 + δ lnUNDERV ALit + fi + ft + uit, (1.1)
in which growthit is the annual rate of increase in country i’s per capita real GDP
from the five-year period t−1 to the next five-year period t, RGDPCHit is the average
level of per capita real GDP over period t, UNDERV ALit is a measure of the degree
of undervaluation of country i’s currency over that period, and fi and ft are country
and time fixed effects. His key result (shown in his Table 1) is that the estimated
coefficient δˆ is found to be significantly positive and substantial in magnitude. The
relation, he argues, is in fact confined to developing countries, as the coefficient is
near zero when the sample is restricted to countries with per capita GDP greater
than $6000 per year; but for the sample consisting only of countries with incomes less
than $6000 per year, the coefficient is both larger and has an even larger t-statistic.
However, it is quite possible that Rodrik’s measure of undervaluation exaggerates
this association. Apart from the constant and fixed-effect terms, his measure of
“undervaluation” is equal to
lnUNDERV ALit = lnRERit + 0.24 lnRGDPCHit, (1.2)
where RERit is the real exchange rate of country i in period t (based on data from the
Penn World Tables, as further discussed in his paper). But since lagged per capita
income is also included as a regressor in equation (1.1), and since2
growthit ≡ (1/5)[lnRGDPCHit − lnRGDPCHi,t−1],
his specification is equivalent to a regression of growthit on the variable
lnRERit + 1.2 growthit
and lagged per capita income, and his coefficient estimate δˆ would be the coefficient
on the “growth-adjusted real exchange rate” in this alternative specification. This
way of viewing Rodrik’s regression specification (1.1) makes it evident that a positive
2Note that t refers to a five-year period in Rodrik’s panel regressions.
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estimate δˆ need not indicate any association between real exchange rates and growth
at all — it may simply reflect the positive correlation between the growth rate and
itself.
Rodrik defends the use of his constructed measure UNDERVAL on the ground
that it is necessary to correct for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. One should expect a
lower real exchange rate (more expensive nontraded goods) for higher-income coun-
tries, owing to the Balassa-Samuelson effect; Rodrik then defines the degree of “un-
dervaluation” of a country’s exchange rate as the degree to which its real exchange
rate is higher than it would be expected to be given the country’s level of per capita
income. The latter prediction is made by regressing lnRERit on lnRGDPCHit in a
panel regression with time effects but no country fixed effects, so that the correlation
between countries’ average real exchange rates and their average income levels can be
used to estimate the relation. The coefficient on per capita income in this first-stage
regression is (the negative of) the 0.24 appearing in the definition (1.2).
However, there are two objections that must be raised to this argument. First,
Rodrik’s panel regressions already include country fixed effects. Hence average dif-
ferences in the level of the real exchange rate associated with particular countries
(for example, the developing countries with low real exchange rates for the reason
explained by Balassa and Samuelson) would have no consequences for the regression
coefficient δˆ, even in the absence of Rodrik’s proposed “adjustment” of the RER mea-
sure. There is only a need for a further adjustment if the Balassa-Samuelson effect
is expected to create a higher-frequency correlation between income and the real ex-
change rate as well — if the five-year periods in which a country’s per capita income
is relatively higher are ones in which it should correspondingly have a relatively lower
exchange rate — and the fact that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is well-established
as a factor explaining long-run average differences between countries does not make
it obvious that such a high-frequency effect should be important. (As a theoretical
matter, this should only be true to the extent that it is also true at higher frequencies
that variations in the rate of productivity growth in the production of tradeables are
an important source of variations in both aggregate output growth on the one hand
and the relative price of tradeables on the other.)
Second, even supposing that the high-frequency Balassa-Samuelson effect exists,
the proposed correction will not necessarily be the correct one, and will generally
introduce an upward bias in the estimated coefficient δˆ. This is because the Balassa-
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Samuelson effect is not a direct causal effect of income on the real exchange rate
(or equivalently, on the relative price of tradeables). Instead, it is a mechanism
according to which both income and the relative price of tradeables are affected by a
third variable (the rate of productivity growth in the tradeables sector), which creates
a negative correlation between the two variables (to the extent that other factors do
not also simultaneously affect both variables).
The correction proposed by Rodrik would be appropriate if one believed that
income and the real exchange rate were determined by a structural model of the form
E = −β Y + P + u (1.3)
Y = dE + v (1.4)
where I now simply write E for the log real exchange rate and Y for log per capita
income, P is a policy variable (treated as exogenous), and u and v are additional ex-
ogenous disturbances. Here (1.3) is a structural model of real exchange rate determi-
nation, in which the term −βY represents the (high-frequency) “Balassa-Samuelson
effect” for which Rodrik apparently wishes to correct, and the term P indicates the
kind of policy that can influence the degree of undervaluation, the effects of which
upon growth Rodrik wishes to determine. Equation (1.4) is a structural model of
income determination, in which the term dE represents the growth effect of the real
exchange rate as such (i.e., independent of what has caused the exchange rate to
vary) hypothesized by Rodrik. Though no such model is spelled our or defended,
something of this form is implicit in Rodrik’s empirical strategy.
Suppose that (1.3)–(1.4) were a correct model, and suppose furthermore that one
has a strategy that allows one to identify the correct value of β (say, from the coun-
tries’ long-run differences in incomes and in real exchange rates, on the supposition
that there are no long-run cross-country differences in the terms P or u).3 Under
these assumptions, the “adjusted” real exchange rate
U ≡ E + βY (1.5)
will provide a measure of the composite disturbance u˜ ≡ u + P. Under the further
simplifying assumption that v is orthogonal to u˜, the coefficient δˆ from a regression
3To simplify the discussion, I shall abstract from the problems created by the use of a generated
regressor, and treat the true value of β as known with certainty.
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This is precisely the interpretation that Rodrik wishes to give to his estimate of δˆ.
But among the several assumptions required for this approach to yield a consistent
estimate of ∂Y/∂P, note that the “Balassa-Samuelson effect” is treated as a direct
effect of Y on E in equation (1.3). In fact, this is not the nature of the Balassa-
Samuelson theory. Even treating the theory as one that refers to purely instantaneous
and static effects (that therefore have the same quantitative form at all frequencies),
the model should instead be one of the form
E = −a T + P + u (1.7)
Y = c T + dE + v (1.8)
where T is a measure of productivity in the tradeables sector, and according to
the Balassa-Samuelson theory, the coefficients a and c are both positive. Here P is
again a policy that is hypothesized to directly affect the exchange rate and dE again
indicates the hypothesized effect of exchange-rate variations (from whatever source)
on national income. I shall suppose that T is an exogenous disturbance, independent
of all of the factors P, u, and v.
Suppose now that the true structural model is of the form (1.7)–(1.8), but that
one is able to correctly estimate the elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect
to variations in per capita income due purely to variations in productivity of the
tradeables sector, which is what one needs for the Balassa-Samuelson adjustment






(This could be estimated by a cross-country regression of long-run average real ex-
change rates on long-run average levels of per capita income, under the assumption
that there are no cross-country differences in the long-run average values of either u˜ or
v.) And again suppose that one constructs an “adjusted” real exchange rate, defined
as in (1.5). What will be the economic interpretation of the coefficient δˆ obtained by
regressing Y on U? In particular, will it provide a consistent estimate of ∂Y/∂P?
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Under the assumption that β is correctly estimated, U will be a measure of “un-
dervaluation” that has been purged of any effects of variations in the productivity of






In this sense one has controlled for variations in the real exchange rate due to the
Balassa-Samuelson effect. But this does not suffice to make δˆ a consistent estimate
of ∂Y/∂P . Even under the assumption (for simplicity) that v is orthogonal to u˜, δˆ is













for two distinct reasons. Even if σ2v = 0, (1.9) will equal δ rather than d, but because
the Balassa-Samuelson effect is not a direct effect of income on the exchange rate (as
represented in (1.3)), the policy-relevant elasticity is d rather than δ. But likely more
importantly, if σ2v > 0, the second term in (1.9) represents an upward bias in the
estimate δˆ. One would find a positive estimate for δˆ even if the true policy elasticity
d were equal to zero.
Not only is the coefficient obtained from a regression on U likely to be biased;
it is far from obvious that this should be a more reliable estimate than would be
obtained by simply regressing on the unadjusted real exchange rate. Assuming again
that v is orthogonal to u˜, our simple model implies that the coefficient dˆ obtained by





This will be an under-estimate of the true policy elasticity d (if β > 0 and σ2T > 0),
owing to the failure to correct for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. But the bias will be





which is to say, as long as productivity growth in the tradeables sector accounts for
a relatively small share of total high-frequency variation in the exchange rate. This
last assumption seems a fairly reasonable one, except over quite long time periods.
How dependent are Rodrik’s results on the use of the UNDERVAL measure? His
Table 3 presents results for corresponding panel regressions using a variety of simple
real exchange rate measures instead of his “adjusted” measure. In most cases, the
measure of undervaluation is no longer a significant explanatory factor when the
entire sample of countries is used. Rodrik instead stresses that when one restricts
attention to the sample of developing countries, there remains a significantly positive4
coefficient on the measure of undervaluation in three out of the four cases (albeit a
substantially smaller coefficient than when UNDERVAL is used).5
These results indicate that within the sample of lower-income countries, there is a
positive association between the level of the real exchange rate and growth, after one
controls for country effects and time effects; Rodrik’s basic finding is not purely an
artifact of the way in which his preferred measure of undervaluation is constructed.
Nonetheless, if one were to emphasize the results using the real exchange rate (as
I would prefer), one would not only obtain a smaller numerical magnitude for the
estimated effect, but more reason for concern for the robustness of the finding.
For example, when one uses the real exchange rate as the measure of undervalu-
ation, it becomes more important to restrict attention to the sample of “developing”
countries in order to find evidence of the association between undervaluation and
growth. But this in turn leads to questions about what should define the sample of
countries that are included. Table 1 illustrates the consequences for the value of the
estimated coefficient δˆ of alternative choices of the set of countries included in the
sample. Here the measure of undervaluation used is the real exchange rate measure
4Here I mean significance at the 5 percent level or less. In the fourth case, the coefficient remains
significant at the 10 percent level; see the next footnote.
5In Rodrik’s baseline regression, using the measure UNDERVAL, he obtains an estimate δˆ = 0.026
with a t-statistic of 5.84. If the real exchange rate (the same measureRERit based on the PennWorld
Tables that is used in constructing UNDERV ALit) is instead used as the measure of undervaluation,
the estimate of δˆ falls to only 0.016, but with a t-statistic of 3.74, this remains a highly significant
positive value. Depending on the measure of the real exchange rate used, the coefficient estimates
reported in Table 3 are as low as 0.012, but the lowest t-statistic among the four measures considered
is 1.92, so that the coefficient is close to being significant at the five percent level even in that case.
7
Table 1: Consequences of the choice of sample of developing countries for the esti-
mated value of δˆ.
sample coeff s.e. t-stat
Y < $6K .0144 .0038 3.77
Y < $8K .0091 .0037 2.50
$1K < Y < $8K .0077 .0040 1.91
from the Penn World Tables (the one used in columns 1 and 2 of Rodrik’s Table 3).6
Line 1 of the table essentially replicates the result reported by Rodrik in Table 3.7
Line 2 shows, however, that the estimated coefficient is reduced by one-third if the
income cutoff is raised from $6000 to $8000. It is not obvious that only countries
with per capita income less than $6000 should be regarded as developing countries;
in particular, if the justification for expecting the effect that one is interested in to
be present only in lower-income countries is that these countries have weaker insti-
tutions, it is not obvious that countries with incomes between $6000 and $8000 do
not also have suffer from many of the institutional weaknesses that are common in
the developing world.8 But the evidence for a positive association between the real
exchange rate and growth is considerably weaker when these additional countries are
included in the set of “developing” countries. Moreover, the evidence becomes weaker
still if the lowest-income countries (those with per capital incomes less than $1000)
are excluded from the sample. (One is surely not much interested in using the expe-
riences of these desperate countries as illustrations of a successful growth strategy.)
When these countries are dropped from the sample, the estimated effect is only about
half as large as for the “developing” sample used by Rodrik, and no longer significant
at the 5 percent level.
6Note that among the real exchange rate measures that Rodrik considers in Table 3, this is the
one that results in the most significant positive value for δˆ when the sample is restricted to countries
with per capita income less than $6000.
7As noted above, Rodrik reports a slightly larger coefficient (0.016) and a t-statistic of 3.74.
8The countries in this set are Swaziland, South Korea, Poland, South Africa, Turkmenistan,
Chile, Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Venezuela, Bulgaria, Uruguay, and Mauritius.
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2 Does the Correlation Indicate Causality?
Even granting the existence of a positive correlation between the level of a country’s
real exchange rate and its growth rate, is it legitimate to interpret this as evidence
of a causal effect of the exchange rate on growth? In particular, is it evidence of a
causal mechanism that can be relied upon in predicted the effects of a policy seeking
to maintain a depreciated exchange rate?
I should begin by admitting that I suspect that at least some of the positive as-
sociation found in the data does reflect episodes in which policies that manipulate
the exchange rate have significant consequences for growth — specifically, examples
of a familiar sort, in which policies that maintain an overvalued exchange rate create
distortions that stifle economic activity. But Rodrik stresses that this well-known
lesson is not the only connection between exchange-rate policy and growth; the de-
clared purpose of his paper is to establish that policies leading to undervaluation are
also beneficial to growth. Yet this is hardly established merely by observing that
countries are able to reduce their growth rates by intervening to maintain an over-
valued exchange rate. For example, the policies that maintain a severely overvalued
exchange rate typically involve rationing of access to foreign exchange, and one may
suppose that it is these controls, rather than the level of the exchange rate as such,
that accounts for much of the reduction in economic performance; but if so, one can
hardly argue on this ground that other types of interference with free convertibility
will instead increase efficiency, as long as the controls maintain an undervalued ex-
change rate rather than an overvalued one. One might instead expect growth to be
favored by a policy that does not create distortions of either sign.
Rodrik offers several comments on the issue of causality. The first is an assertion
that while an inference of causality from real exchange rate depreciation to growth
would be problematic “in a world where governments did not care about the real
exchange rate and left it to be determined purely by market forces,” in fact “most
governments pursue a variety of policies with the explicit goal of affecting the real
exchange rate.” But there is a great leap between the observation that real exchange
rates are affected by policy and an assumption that the real exchange rate is purely
determined by policy, and by policies that are exogenous with respect to the state
of the economy at that. Yet it would only be under the assumption that the real
exchange rate is an exogenous policy choice that one would be able to sidestep the
9
issue of causality.
In fact, Rodrik admits that endogeneity of the real exchange rate is an issue, and
proposes two ways of dealing with it. One is an extension of his regression model
to include additional explanatory variables, such as the inflation rate, government
consumption as a share of GDP, and gross domestic saving as a share of GDP. In-
clusion of additional variables lowers the coefficient δˆ on the UNDERVAL variable,
but the coefficient remains significantly positive;9 this is taken to suggest that there
is indeed a positive effect of undervaluation on growth, even after one has controlled
for possible sources of endogenous variation in the real exchange rate. In fact, Rodrik
suggests that some of the endogenous variation in the exchange rate that has been
controlled for ought really to be counted as policy-induced exchange rate variation:
“To the extent that [policies that reduce government consumption or increase sav-
ing] are designed to move the real exchange rate in the first place, they are part of
what I have in mind when I talk of a ‘policy of undervaluation’.” This last point,
however, is hardly convincing: if it is shown that policies that increase saving, for
example, increase economic growth even when policymakers adopt them because of
their anticipated consequences for the real exchange rate, it would hardly follow that
policymakers should therefore be advised to attempt to depreciate the real exchange
rate by whatever means possible; for the growth effect of the increased saving might
occur through other channels than through the effect on the real exchange rate. More-
over, the mere fact that one has controlled for some possible kinds of endogeneity of
the real exchange rate is hardly a proof that the remaining variation is exogenous.
Rodrik’s final argument is an assertion that “many of the plausible sources of
bias ... would induce a negative relationship between undervaluation and growth,
not the positive relationship that I have documented.” This, in his view, makes an
interpretation of the positive value of δˆ as reflecting omitted-variable bias implausible.
It is accordingly perhaps worth discussing a simple example of how endogeneity of
the real exchange rate could result in a positive correlation between the real exchange
rate and growth, even under circumstances where devaluation would not stimulate
economic activity at all.
I shall illustrate my point using a purposely oversimplified model of equilib-
9Of course, this robustness of the significantly positive coefficient may reflect the bias resulting
from use of the UNDERVAL measure, discussed above.
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rium real exchange rate determination.10 Consider a two-period (t = 1, 2) small-
open-economy model, with two sectors (j = T,N), producing tradeables and non-
tradeables, respectively. I assume a competitive world market for the T good (which
will also be the numeraire), and a world real interest rate r > 0 (in terms of the T
good, between periods 1 and 2) that is unaffected by the net capital flows of the small







where Kjt is the capital stock in sector j, Hjt is hours of labor in that sector, and the
coefficient 0 < αj < 1 may be sector-specific. The initial capital stocks Kj1 of both
sectors are given as parameters, and I assume that KN2, the capital stock of the N
sector in the second period, is given exogenously as well. (To simplify, I shall assume
a constant exogenous value, KNt = KN for both periods t.) The second-period capital
stock of the tradeables sector instead depends on investment spending I, according
to the law of motion
KT2 = I + (1− δ)KT1,
where 0 < δ < 1 is the rate of depreciation of capital in the T sector.
I assume that the representative household in the small economy seeks to maximize
U = U1 + βU2,
where the contribution to utility in period t is of the form
Ut = γ logCNt + (1− γ) logCTt − λ
1 + ν
H1+νt ,
in which expression Cjt is consumption in period t of the sector-j good, and Ht is
hours worked, and the preference parameters satisfy ν > 0 and 0 < β, γ < 1. For
simplicity I assume competitive domestic spot markets each period for both labor and
the N good, neither of which is traded internationally. Finally, the government sets
10In particular, my use here of a model in which monetary policy cannot affect the real exchange
rate does not mean that I believe that in reality, monetary cannot influence the real exchange rate,
at least for a time. My point is simply to show that a positive empirical correlation between the real
exchange rate and real activity need not imply anything about the magnitude of the growth effects
of exchange rate policy; and the point is made most simply with a model in which there is no scope
at all for monetary policy to affect real variables, even in the short run.
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the nominal exchange rate each period, which then determines the domestic-currency
price of the T good in that period (by the law of one price). I shall suppose that
the government also imposes a proportional tax τ on savings in period 1, so that the
real return received by domestic savers is (1− τ)(1 + r). I abstract from government
consumption; hence the government revenue raised by the tax is assumed to be simply
rebated lump-sum to households.
In any period t, given values for (KTt, YTt), one can solve uniquely for equilibrium
values of HTt, HNt, YNt = CNt, CTt, wt, and PNt, where here both the wage wt and
the price of non-tradeables PNt are quoted in units of the T good. (Thus wt is a real
wage and PNt is actually the relative price of non-tradeables.) One can easily show
that there is a unique, differentiable solution for each of these variables, and that the
solution functions satisfy (among other properties)
∂CT
∂YT








< 0, 0 <
∂ log YN
∂ logKT










< 0, 0 <
∂ logPN
∂ logKT
= −∂ log YN
∂ log YT
.
Using these solution functions, an intertemporal equilibrium can then be described
as a set of values for the endogenous variables (YT1, KT2, YT2) that satisfy the three
equilibrium conditions






CT (KT2, YT2) = β˜(1 + r)CT (KT1, YT1) (2.2)
(1− αT )YT2 = (1 + r)KT2 (2.3)
given values of the exogenous parameters (KT1, r, β˜), where
β˜ ≡ β(1− τ).
Here (2.1) is the requirement that there be intertemporal balance in the country’s
capital account (assuming zero net foreign assets at the beginning of period 1); (2.2)
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is the Euler equation for an optimal saving decision by the representative household;
and (2.3) is the first-order condition for profit-maximizing investment demand, stating
that the anticipated marginal product of capital in period 2 must equal 1 plus the
required real rate of return.11 One can again show that there is a unique solution to
these three equations for the endogenous variables as differentiable functions of the
exogenous parameters.
Consider now the consequences of an exogenous increase in the composite param-
eter β˜, which implies an increase in domestic households’ willingness to save, either
as a result of a change in preferences (an increase in β) or a change in policy that
increases incentives for saving (a reduction in τ). Total differentiation of the system














Hence an increase in the willingness to save in period 1 (whether due to changing
attitudes or to changing incentives) will simultaneously increase the production of
tradeables (YT1), the small country’s exports (YT1−CT1), and its real GDP (GDP1),
while reducing the relative price of non-tradeables (PN1) and hence increasing the
real exchange rate.
Note that this equilibrium scenario resembles the phenomenon often interpreted as
“export-led growth”: a real depreciation of the country’s exchange rate coincides with
an increase in exports and an increase in total GDP (hence an increase in the growth
rate). Moreover, if one were to compare a panel of small open economies, to each
of which the above model applies, with identical parameter values except for cross-
country variation in the value of β˜, one would observe a positive correlation between a
country’s real exchange rate in period 1 and its growth rate in that period.12 Yet the
11Note that since period 2 is the last period of the model, there is effectively 100 percent depre-
ciation of capital in this period.
12The exogenous parameters taking identical values for the different countries are assumed to
include the level of GDP in the period prior to period 1, with respect to which the period 1 growth
rate is calculated.
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high-growth countries would not be in this situation because of their exchange-rate
policies; their higher growth rates would be due to other factors (factors that favor
a higher saving rate) that happen to lead both to a lower equilibrium real exchange
rate and to higher GDP growth. Moreover, the model is one in which if a country
were to use monetary policy to depreciate its nominal exchange rate, this would not
affect growth (or any other real variables, including the real exchange rate) — it
would only raise the nominal domestic prices of both tradeables and non-tradeables
(without affecting their relative price).
It is true that there is a policy intervention, in the simple model, that would
depreciate the real exchange rate; this is a reduction in the tax rate on savings τ ,
which is one of the factors determining the value of β˜. And such a policy change
would increase GDP (through its effect on saving), in the same way as an increase
in households’ patience would. But it does not really make sense to call this a
demonstration that a deliberate policy of exchange-rate depreciation can be used
to stimulate, since the most obvious example of a policy with that intent would be
completely ineffective.13
The example shows that it is certainly possible for an omitted variable to move
both the real exchange rate and GDP in the same direction, so that this is a poten-
tial interpretation of a positive coefficient δˆ in Rodrik’s panel regression. But is this
theoretical possibility likely to be of practical relevance? Here it is worth noting that
Rodrik’s regressions (reported in his Table 10) show that a country’s gross domestic
saving rate (as a share of GDP) has a significant positive effect on his UNDERVAL
measure of undervaluation of the country’s currency; and of course, a higher saving
rate is also correlated with higher growth, as many authors have noted, and as Ro-
drik’s panel regressions in Tables 4 and 5 show. (The latter regressions show that the
saving rate is a significant variable in explaining differences in growth across country-
time pairs, even when the undervaluation measure is also included in the regression;
and that inclusion of the saving rate as an explanatory variable reduced the size of
the estimated coefficient on the measure of undervaluation.)
Rodrik notes that the inclusion of the saving rate in the growth regressions does
not completely eliminate the significance of UNDERVAL as an explanatory variable,
and concludes from this that endogeneity resulting from factors of the kind illustrated
13Moreover, some other policies that would result in real exchange rate depreciation as a byproduct
would lower GDP growth rather than raising it.
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in the simple example do not fully account for the association between undervalu-
ation and growth. But the fact that inclusion of a single proxy for factors of the
kind represented by the simple example eliminates only part of the association be-
tween UNDERVAL and growth14 hardly establishes that endogenous mechanisms of
this kind are not responsible for the correlation — in particular, for the cases in
which undervaluation coincides with strong growth, as opposed to the cases in which
overvaluation coincides with weak growth.
The simple example also illustrates another important point. The mere existence
of a positive correlation between the real exchange rate and growth (across some
class of developing countries) need not be evidence of any greater distortions in the
tradeables sector, that can in turn justify policies that essentially act as subsidies to
that sector. Ultimately, this is Rodrik’s argument for the pursuit of an undervalued
exchange rate: one would like to subsidize the production of tradeables, but for
political economy reasons, it may be most practical to do so by manipulating the
exchange rate rather than through industrial policy. But the main evidence that
is offered for the hypothesis of an inefficiently small relative size of the tradeables
sector in developing economies is the evidence for a stimulative effect of real exchange
rate depreciation. Yet in the simple model, a positive correlation exists between
the real exchange rate and growth — and higher growth is associated with a shift
of resources from the non-tradeables to the tradeables sector — but this does not
mean that the equilibrium production of tradeables is suboptimal. In the case that
τ = 0, the intertemporal equilibrium maximizes the welfare of the representative
household (subject to the constraint that trade with the rest of the world must satisfy
intertemporal balance of the capital account; and the introduction of a subsidy for the
production of tradeables would reduce welfare, relative to that optimum. Similarly,
the introduction of other sorts of market distortions that represent indirect ways of
subsidizing the tradeables sector would most likely reduce welfare, whether or not
they would increase GDP.
14Again, one should remember that it is only the association of UNDERVAL with growth that
is shown to be robust to inclusion of the saving rate in the regression, not the association between
simple measures of the real exchange rate and growth. One should not expect the association
between UNDERVAL and growth to be completely eliminated by the inclusion of any number of
regressors representing determinants of the real exchange rate, because UNDERVAL also reflects
the economy’s growth rate, as explained above.
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3 A Case Study: South Korea
Ultimately, the issue of causality is unlikely to be settled using panel regressions of
the kind that constitute Rodrik’s main results, owing to a lack of suitable instru-
ments for exogenous changes in exchange-rate policy. Case studies can often be more
illuminating in this regard. Here I consider only one, the case of South Korea. I
select this country for further consideration because it is one of the countries which
Rodrik displays as an illustration of the association of growth with undervaluation
of the exchange rate (see his Figure 3). A more complete picture of the degree of
support for Rodrik’s thesis that is provided by the example of South Korea can be
obtained by looking at higher-frequency data (rather than only the five-year averages
shown in his figure) and at additional time series besides those for UNDERVAL and
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Figure 1: The nominal and real exchange rate: South Korea, 1953-2004.
Figure 1 plots annual data for both the (official) nominal exchange rate (between
the won and the U.S. dollar) and the implied real exchange rate, as well as the
relative price level between South Korea and the U.S. In the plot of the nominal
exchange rate, one sees that there were several large devaluations in the 1950s and
1960s — in particular, those in 1955, 1960, 1961, and 1964.15 These do each result (at
15There was a 30 percent devaluation in February 1960, followed by another 100 percent devalua-
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least temporarily) in substantial depreciations of the real exchange rate, and so closer
examination of the Korean experience clearly shows that at least some of the relatively
high-frequency variation in the real exchange rate represents effects of exchange-rate
policy. But at the same time, the plot also makes it clear that devaluations need
not have any long-lasting effect on the real exchange rate. In the case of the 1955
devaluation, much of the effect on the real exchange rate has already been undone
by increased inflation by 1957; in the case of the 1961 devaluation, much of the effect
has been undone by increased inflation by 1963. Indeed, this fact explains why the
Korean government found additional large devaluations to be necessary so soon after
the previous ones.
It is true that the 1964 devaluation might appear to have been more successful;
for the next decade, Korea maintained a real exchange rate that was substantially
weaker than it had been during most of the 1950s. And of course this was also the
decade over which Korea’s real GDP growth accelerated to a rate of 6-8 percent per
year (as shown in Figure 2), which Rodrik interprets as supporting the view that an
undervalued currency was the key to the Korean growth “miracle.” But in order to
attribute the sustained real depreciation to the 1964 devaluation, one must explain
why earlier devaluations did not have similarly long-lasting effects.
An obvious interpretation would be that while in the earlier cases, there had
not been any change in the equilibrium real exchange rate, so that monetary policy
could weaken the real exchange only temporarily, the 1964 devaluation coincided
with a weakening of the equilibrium real rate, so that the devaluation — rather than
resulting in a true undervaluation — facilitated a shift in the real exchange rate that
would have had to occur in any event. Why might the equilibrium real exchange rate
have weakened? A clue is provided by the fact that the gross domestic saving rate
surged after the early 1960s, as is also shown in Figure 2.
Prior to 1965, ceilings on bank deposit rates depressed household saving, since
(under the high inflation of the time) the implied real interest rates on deposits were
negative. Instead, households lent funds to the informal financial sector, where inter-
est rates were quite high. By raising interest rate ceilings in 1965 and at the same time
reducing inflation, the government brought household savings back into the banking
system, and so reduced the cost of capital for businesses through more efficient in-
tion in February 1961, though the annual data are not high-frequency enough to show two distinct
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log(Real Exchange Rate)*10 − LHS
Real per capita GDP Growth (5−yr MA) − LHS
Gross Saving Rate (% of GDP) − RHS
Figure 2: The real exchange rate, saving, and growth: South Korea, 1953-2004.
termediation (Kim, 1991, p. 137). In addition, tighter fiscal policy increased public
saving, further contributing to the sharp increase in overall domestic saving.
This increase in domestic saving — which coincided fairly closely with the accel-
eration of economic growth — was likely an important cause of the growth miracle.
Moreover, the simple model presented above shows that increased incentives for sav-
ing can also increase the equilibrium real exchange rate. This may be one of the
reasons for the equilibrium real exchange rate for Korea to have been higher in the
late 1960s and early 1970s than it had been earlier, which would explain why the
effects of the 1964 devaluation on the real exchange rate were not quickly reversed.
Indeed, Kim (1991, p. 132) argues that Korea’s persistent current account deficit
and buildup of external debt in the decade after 1965 point to won overvaluation, not
undervaluation, in this period.16
Of course, the view suggested by this discussion of the Korean case does not imply
that exchange rate policy is completely irrelevant to a country’s development strategy.
Overly tight regulation of financial flows can be an important impediment to growth,
as seems to have been the case in Korea before the 1960s; and extensive controls
are often required by policies that seek to maintain an overvalued exchange rate.
16This is a further reason to doubt the accuracy of Rodrik’s UNDERVAL measure.
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Hence creation of conditions conducive to growth will, among other things, mean
refraining from attempts to maintain a seriously overvalued currency. Moreover, the
Korean case shows that the process of development may involve a reduction in the
equilibrium real exchange rate (that is, the one that would result from fully flexible
wages and prices and an absence of impediments to capital flows). In such a case,
a nominal devaluation of the currency can be valuable, as a way of allowing the
necessary real depreciation to occur without the more painful process of forcing wage
and prices down in response to insufficient aggregate demand. But such a policy is
not correctly described as the pursuit of an “undervalued” currency; rather, it is again
an example of the wisdom of avoiding overvaluation, with the important proviso that
the equilibrium rate, with respect to which overvaluation must be defined, can easily
change as the economic structure changes.
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